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Scientific progress has brought us many rewards: new energy
sources, more effective medical care, and a greater understanding of
ourselves and our physical environment. Simultaneously, scientific
progress has created new risks arising from, for example, toxic sub-
stances, side-effects of drug products, and unforeseen effects of seem-
ingly harmless substances (from freon to coffee). Modem science has
expanded the language of "risk" to include whole new categories of
previously unsuspected hazards: carcinogenesis (the induction of run-
away growth of the cells of some part of the body); mutagenesis (modi-
fication of the body's genetic material); and teratogenesis (alteration of
the development of a fetus in utero).1 Desiring the benefits of science,
we must develop principles for regulating scientific activities that create
risks and institutional approaches to handle the complex issues modem
science and technology create.
Marshall S. Shapo,2 inA Nation of Guinea Pigs, attempts to satisfy
the first need. Shapo presents four case studies of technologies at the
interface of law and science: birth control pills; DES (diethylstilbester-
01); taconite dumping in Lake Superior by Reserve Mining; and recom-
binant DNA research. These case studies represent a "manifestation of
a general social problem":3 risks that have an "unknowable and insidi-
ous character,"'4 are "manmade in origin, ' 5 and present unexpected
hazards that confound our expectations of the safety of modem tech-
nology. These hazards represent the larger class of products and activi-
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ties whose long-term effects are uncertain. Members of the general
public, who are exposed to the risks of these products and activities,
are, in effect, subjects or guinea pigs; hence, the title of the book.
I. SHAPo's THEsIs
A. Risks and the Scientftc Enterprise.
Having defined the problem as controlling scientific progress,
Shapo turns first to the nature of science on the assumption that we
must understand science to govern it. He draws heavily on Jerome
Ravetz's work6 in elaborating on the nature of science and its complex-
ities. Science is concerned with artifacts that represent a reality one
cannot view directly. Scientific inquiry has a substantial craft compo-
nent: the use of judgment and experience in recording, measuring, and
evaluating data, to avoid what Ravetz has termed "pitfalls." 7 Pitfalls
are traps for the unwary. For example, a pitfall can be a concealed
error in data, an equipment malfunction, or an ambiguity or false de-
duction undermining an argument's reasoning. Scientific "truths," ten-
tative in their initial contours and subject to continual reassessment, are
therefore considerably more evanescent than lawyers or lay people
realize.
Shapo points out that the complexity and uncertainty of most sci-
entific judgments suggest caution in evaluating apparently definitive
scientific conclusions. The legal system therefore needs a sophisticated
method to translate the scientific dialect, and when such translation
fails, the adoption of a risk-averse stance toward the particular hazard. 8
Given the complexity of modern science, a primary problem is "the
case in which scientists and technological innovators are themselves
quite uncertain about the long-term consequences of their activities.
Yet even in their uncertainty, they are prone to make technical state-
ments that are impenetrable to the layman."9
Novelty is the hallmark of science. New specialties now exist that
were unrecognized fifty years ago.10 This proliferation of "new" sci-
ences (e.g., recombinant DNA) poses a dilemma for the policy maker:
science is both a creator of risks and the sole means of measuring and
evaluating those risks.
6. J. RAVETZ, SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND ITS SOCIAL PROBLEMS (1971).
7. Id. 95-97.
8. M. SHAPo, supra note 3, at 14.
9. Id.
10. Id. 8.
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Shapo also discusses the dynamics of modem science and its mode
of investigation. Modem science is specialized and capital intensive,
requiring large sums to start up and continue research, either from the
government or from private enterprise. Because private enterprise
must recoup in sales the costs of research and development, there is a
tendency toward less extensive experimentation and quicker marketing
of goods than when such functions are governmentally funded. It is
when scientific progress is greatest that these pressures most affect en-
trepreneurs and thus compel strict scrutiny of their evaluations of risk.
Scientific research takes substantial time; often years are necessary to
complete a project. The legal system's structuring of incentives can se-
riously affect the production of scientific data. Rules directly regulat-
ing the conduct of science must therefore be sensitive to possible
negative effects in curtailing or deterring research."
The initial difficulty for the regulators of science is their depen-
dence on the scientists who work in a highly specialized and technical
area. As Shapo acknowledges, "in the trenches of research, operational
decisions of considerable magnitude must fall on the bench scientist."1 2
An additional difficulty is the divergent incentives that can motivate a
scientist. Incentives to take shortcuts counterbalance the scientist's
concern for reputation and for continued funding. Restrictions on re-
search entail time and expense, and priority of discovery is essential to
enhance one's career.
Shapo points out the growth in the number of practitioners of sci-
ence and the proliferation of its research product. Currently thirty
thousand scientific journals are published, and over three hundred
journals exist that print only abstracts of current articles. 13 Shapo com-
ments: "Legislation designed to control potentially hazardous experi-
mentation or the marketing of products that may pose a threat to
human life should respond to the difficulties of unearthing as well as
assessing information that may signal danger to the expert but is not
within the ken of ordinary citizens." 14
Regulators must understand the sociology of science, therefore, to
evaluate effectively the likelihood of honest assessment by scientists of
the hazards of a line of research, a product, or a process. Scientists in
contemporary practice may be organized according to the orthodoxy of
a particular institution. Dangers of conformity, which can stifle honest
assessment, can be counterbalanced by the effects of monitored scien-
11. Id. 6.
12. Id. 238.
13. Id. 7.
14. Id. 7.
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tificjournals that subject articles to stringent selection and editing. Big
Science may, however, lead to a High Priesthood, in which leaders con-
trol the direction of the field.'5
Shapo's discussion of the scientific enterprise is a useful introduc-
tion for a reader ignorant of the dynamics of science. Unfortunately, it
is useful to understanding only chapter eight, which discusses the re-
combinant DNA controversy. Shapo fails to discuss in an introductory
manner the nature of scientific evidence in assessing the hazards of var-
ious substances; the range of tests that are available for testing human
reactions to drugs, airborne agents, and other environmental agents;
and means by which a court or agency can better understand the nature
of the risks and the evidence it must consider.' 6
B. The Nature of Experimentation.
The book's title, A Nation of Guinea Pigs, is drawn from Shapo's
broad definition of experimentation. Shapo stretches the term "experi-
ment" to encompass a spectrum ranging from traditional medical ex-
periments to the mass-marketing of products. He defines
"experimentation" as "an attempt to solve problems in a fresh and
novel way, using the subjects of the attempt as a means to gather infor-
mation ...widespread distribution [of products] in fact involves a
continuous process of experimentation."' 7 Concerned about unknown
risks, Shapo worries about the "external consequences of scientific pro-
gress which may not be known until after the introduction of a new
product or process, sometimes months or years later."' i8 The law's task
is to limit such adverse consequences, in part by providing incentives to
scientific professionals "to identify possibilities as well as probabilities
that [such consequences] will happen."'19 His concern is to define atti-
tudes toward risk in concrete situations.20
Shapo's notion of market experimentation is not original,2' but he
15. Id. 11.
16. See W. LOWRANCE, supra note 1, for a general orientation to the problem of scientific
evidence and risk.
17. M. SHAPO, supra note 3, at 30.
18. Id. 12.
19. Id.
20. Id. 26-27.
21. He echoes the concerns of earlier reformers about the flood of advertising of potentially
dangerous products. For example, in A. KALLETT & F. SHLINK, 100,000,000 GUINEA PIGS (1933),
Kallet and Shlink graphically describe market experimentation in an era bereft of a Federal Trade
Commission and a Food and Drug Administration:
In the magazines, in the newspapers, over the radio, a terrific verbal barrage has been
laid down on a hundred million Americans, first, to set in motion a host of fears about
their health, their stomachs, their bowels, their teeth, their throats, their looks; second, to
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tries to give the notion a philosophical underpinning by emphasizing
individual inviolability, with the corollary that "one who proposes to
impinge on the physical or psychological intactness of another must
justify his act."'22 This burden of justification on the actor who would
cross a person's boundary is required even if a strong argument can be
made for the social utility of the act.23
Shapo acknowledges that a new technology over the long run can
have a net benefit, even though it generates risks. Considerations of
utility are appropriate so long as the victims consent to the risks to
which they are exposed.24 Consent must be focused, however, specifi-
cally on the hazards particular to the experiment. The degree of con-
sent required may vary according to available information,
comprehension, and external pressures.25 "And sometimes consent will
not be enough by itself to achieve a solution. It may be necessary to
require review by both experts and nonexperts, rationalized decisions
on the record, and the advance provision of compensation for those
injured in experiments. '26
"Experimentation" is a loaded term to a lawyer. The history of
abuse and subsequent regulation of experimentation gives the term
perjorative content.27 By using the word to cover such a wide spectrum
of activities, Shapo dulls our ability to make necessary distinctions be-
tween activities for regulatory purposes. He paints with a broad brush
to justify a broad risk-averse regulatory stance, and by doing so obfus-
cates rather than clarifies.
C. Risk-aversion as an Emerging Regulatory Stance.
Shapo sees risk-aversion to "uncertain long-term risks"28 as a gen-
eral trend in contemporary American culture and public policy. His
persuade them that only by eating, drinking, gargling, brushing, or smearing with
Smith's Whole Vitamin Breakfast Food, Jones' Yeast Cubes, Blue Giant Apples, Prus-
sian Salts, Listroboris Mouthwash, Grandpa's Wonder toothpaste, and a thousand and
one other foods, drinks, gargles, and pastes, can they either postpone the onset of disease,
of social ostracism, of business failure, or recover from ailments, physical or social, al-
ready contracted.
Id. 3.
22. M. SHAPO, supra note 3, at 43.
23. Shapo seems to draw upon Nozick's notion of personal inviolability by using the meta-
phor of a boundary around each individual. The development of this idea is found in R. NOZiCK,
ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
24. M. SHAPO, supra note 3, at 44.
25. Id. 46.
26. Id.
27. See AD Hoc ADVISORY PANEL, FINAL REPORT OF THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS STUDY
(1973). See generally J. KATZ, EXPERIMENTATION WITH! HUMAN BEINGS (1972); M. PAPPWORTH,
HUMAN GUINEA PIGS: EXPERIMENTATION ON MAN (1968).
28. Id. 257.
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survey of the modem regulatory terrain leads him to conclude that a
consensus has developed among the American people concerning cu-
mulative unseen and uncertain long-term dangers. He writes: "[The
view has developed that those who market new goods or create external
consequences from processes that are novel or not thoroughly tested
owe the community a scientific affirmation of safety at particular levels
of use, or at least an abundance of warnings and opportunities to make
a choice."2 9 Shapo seems to draw this conclusion primarily from the
actions of the Food and Drug Administration, operating under the reg-
ulatory umbrella of the Delaney Amendment.30 The central chapter of
the book, chapter five, is entitled, "The Delaney Amendment: Rough-
Hewn Regulation." References to the Delaney Amendment, as illus-
trative of a public policy statement based on consensus, permeate the
rest of the book. 31 The Delaney Amendment's uncompromising ap-
proach, says Shapo, "may provide as much refinement as we wish to
afford when it is we who are the guinea pigs."' 32 Society is thus risk-
averse, and our regulatory superstructure tends to mirror society's con-
sensus. Shapo writes:
How much risk we willingly accept is related to general norms of
social acceptability. But over the last half century we have grown
somewhat less philosophical about accepting artificially created,
avertable dangers, especially when information about them is or
readily could be available to those in a position to avoid them.33
Shapo believes we look for protection, first, in improved disclosure
of risks to those affected by new drugs, products, or experiments, and
second, in direct governmental intervention, either by the setting of
standards or by the prohibition of hazards. Disclosure of hazards is
central to Shapo's thesis. Producers of consumer goods are not likely to
disclose hazards. Therefore, we have created a regulatory apparatus,
ie., the Consumer Product Safety Commission, the Food and Drug
Administration, and the Federal Trade Commission, which furthers
consumer protection.
These regulatory agencies not only fill a void of market failure
resulting from information shortcomings; they also compensate for the
limitations of private tort litigation for harm suffered. The risk of pay-
ing damages in a tort case can create a powerful incentive for an indus-
try to improve its practices. The products of many new technologies,
however, such as industrial chemicals, pose causation problems that
29. Id. xv.
30. 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1970).
31. See, e.g., M. SH po, supra note 3, at 164, 188-90, 215, 250.
32. Id. 162.
33. Id. 50.
Vol 1981:8781
DUKE LAW JOUNTAL
tort litigation is ill-equipped to handle.34 As Shapo observes, "Thus
there is a strong thrust toward regulation of things and processes which
blend uncertainty and untraceability, for liability rules will not serve to
vindicate personal interests nor achieve deterrent effects."' 35 Compen-
sation, therefore, provides only a secondary remedy; primary reliance
should be placed on regulation that limits exposure to hazards in ad-
vance.3 6 Legislation provides a "truly public form of choice" 37 when
the market for a product or a service does not function properly.
Shapo makes a strong case for a risk-averse regulatory stance that
places the burden of producing evidence on the proponent of a line of
research or technological application. Whin long-term benefits are
balanced by long-term risks, and both are speculative, he concludes
that the burden of producing evidence concerning risks and benefits
should "rest principally on those who propose to act."'38
The themes developed in the book are thus (1) a new category of
risks, generating (2) a risk-averse posture by the government to protect
us from (3) treatment as guinea pigs in experiments performed without
our consent. Given these premises, Shapo's purpose is to structure an
answer to the question of "what approach government should take to
the creation of risks whose potential for damage is uncertain," 39 a prob-
lem "of defining attitudes toward risk in concrete situations." 40 His ul-
timate goal is to articulate more precisely the foundations "of a more
general theory of legal control of scientific endeavor and its
consequences." 41
II. A CRITIQUE
Shapo proposes no innovative expansion of public regulation of
risky activities and products; instead he elaborates on well-established
government roles, usually in an attempt to justify prior actions. He
seeks to breed caution among regulators, particularly in the regulation
of drugs and toxic chemicals. His analysis is subject to criticism on
several grounds.
First, the use of examples of drug regulation to derive a basic prin-
ciple of risk-aversion as representative of social consensus makes too
34. Id. 55-56.
35. Id.
36. Id. 257.
37. Id. 251.
38. Id. 244.
39. Id. 26.
40. Id. 27.
41. Id. xii.
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large a jump. The food and drug laws were enacted in response to a
great proliferation of patent medicines and the mass marketing of
drugs; and the Delaney Amendment in particular arose in response to
emerging conceptions of the link between cancer and food additives.42
The social context was special. In addition the Delaney Amendment
has been invoked only rarely and circumvented on occasion.43 One
cannot therefore derive a consensus about risk-aversion from the Dela-
ney Amendment.
Second, the basis for this putative consensus is less clear than
Shapo indicates. An individual's decision whether to assume a risk
presupposes that first he measures the risk (i.e., that he has some aware-
ness of its probability and its likely severity if it materializes), and that
next he makes a judgment about the acceptability of the risk. Yet per-
ception of risk is more difficult than it once was because the nature of
risky activities has changed. The risks are now less easily visualized
and understood, they transcend neighborhood or community bounda-
ries, and they threaten damage of greater magnitude, often taking years
to manifest themselves. As a result, it is arguably incorrect to assume,
as Shapo seems to, that all risk-generating activities engender a uni-
form stand of risk-aversion among the populace. For example, when
the nature of the harm that may materialize from a risk-generating ac-
tivity is easy to perceive, as with cancer from radiation or lung damage
from air pollution, individuals may be understandably highly risk-
averse.44
42. See R. MERRILL & P. HUTr, FOOD AND DRUG LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 2-7 (1980).
On the Delaney clause, see Blank, The Delaney Clause: Technical NavetM and Scientfc Advocacy
in the Formulation of Public Health Policies, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 1084 (1974).
43. See Merrill, Book Review, Regulation of Toxic Chemicals, 58 TEx. L. REv. 463, 474-76
(1980).
44. Moreover, individuals can be highly risk-averse to the chance of large losses, even though
the probability of occurrence is slight, and are often willing to pay inordinate sums of money to
eliminate such risks. "The fact is, most people are willing to pay excessive amounts of money to
get rid of vagueness. Perhaps this is because they don't know how to cope with it rationally or
purposively or perhaps the explanation is more purely emotion, the specific reasons are immate-
rial." I. RAIFFA, DECISION ANALYSIS: INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON CHOICES UNDER UNCER-
TAINTY 159 (1970).
The reasons for such risk-averse behavior are unclear. They include historical explanations,
see generally W. RowE, AN ANATOMY OF RISK 263-64 (1977) (past accidents have sensitized us to
the hazards of activities previously thought safe), and biological explanations, see Mole, Accepting
Risksfor Other People, 69 PROC. OF THE ROYAL SOC'Y OF MED. 15 (1976) (there may be an
evolutionary advantage t6 special concern about catastrophic accidents). Studies of insurance
reveal that a protective action that reduces the probability of a harm from one percent to zero is
valued more highly than an action reducing the probability of the same harm from two percent to
one percent. This result reflects a pseudocertainty hypothesis, whereby individuals seek security
against risk, even if in fact the source of security is only the apparent elimination of the risk. See
Tversky & Kahneman, he Framing ofDecision andthe Psychology ofCholce, 211 Sci. 453 (1981).
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The recombinant DNA controversy, however, which Shapo cites
as one case study supporting his general analysis of public policy
trends, provides an example of inappropriately minimal risk-averse be-
havior. Thus, even though the usual risk assessment experiments were
not complete, or even underway, the National Institute of Health regu-
lations allowed most recombinant DNA research to proceed.45 These
regulations are now being dismantled, although they are only a few
years old.46 Rather than focusing on the possible harm that might re-
sult from recombinant DNA research, those who proposed and evalu-
ated further recombinant DNA research considered instead only the
possibility of a research accident, concluding that "the chance of an
accident. . . remains vanishingly small." 47 As a result, the regulators
of recombinant DNA research tended to adopt only a minimally risk-
averse stance.
The real problem with assessment of new risk-generating activities
seems to be that dangers are being ignored by the risk-assessors be-
cause the dangers are difficult to perceive, as in the recombinant DNA
case.48 We tend to underestimate the likelihood of events that are hard
to conceive, outside our normal experience even if conceivable, or lack-
ing in memorability even if conceivable and within our experience. 49
In evaluating the hazards of complex systems, we generally tend to un-
derestimate the probabilities of failure. Current psychological theory
views man as a creature of bounded rationality with "limited computa-
tional ability and possessing limited information and limited imagina-
tion, seeking to survive in a world rich in complexity." °50 The need is
for a mechanism to compensate for cognitive shortcomings and unrec-
ognized or understated hazards. Instead, Shapo offers vague prescrip-
tions for regulators to heed. Risk-aversion does not cut cleanly across
the spectrum of scientific and technological activities. A method is
Whatever the cause, inordinate risk-aversion to catastrophic results is indeed often part of the
mental frame of individuals. See Epstein, A Tastefor Privacy: Evolution and the Emergency of a
Naturalistic Ethic, 9 J. L. STUD. 665 (1980).
45. See Letters from Philip Bereano to Dr. Donald Fredrickson (October 8, 1979, and De-
cember 18, 1979), reprinted in 5 NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE,
U.S. DEPT. OF HEW, RECOMBINANT DNA RESEARCH: DOCUMENTS RELATING TO NIH GUIDE-
LINES FOR RESEARCH INVOLVING RECOMBINANT DNA MOLECULES, JANUARY 1979-JANUARY
1980 346-47, 532 (1980).
46. See Sun, NIH Plan Relaxes Recombinant DN,4 Rules, 213 Sc. 1482 (1981).
47. Holliday, Should Genetic Engineers Be Contained?, 73 NEW SCIENTIST 399, 401 (1977).
48. Tversky & Kalneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCl.
1124, 1128 (1974).
49. Id.; Slovic, Fishoff& Lichtenstein, Cognitive Processes and SocietalRisk Taking, in COG-
NITION AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 165 (J. Carroll & J. Payne eds. 1976).
50. Simon, The Behavioral and Social Sciences, 209 Sc. 72 (1980).
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needed to generate and assess information that is useful in determining
the need for a risk-neutral or risk-averse stance toward particular
hazards.
Third, the supposed principle Shapo has extracted from his cases
may have been based in large part on a "perception of the possibilities
of public policy," in the words of Aaron Wildavsky.51 We have come
to expect more from regulation; we expect it to deal both with newly
emerging hazards and with familiar ones that we are no longer willing
to tolerate. Basing a principle of risk-aversion on such a perception is
dangerous because the perception of the capabilities of public regula-
tion can change. Indeed, it may be changing in light of the Reagan
administration's actions and the new conventional wisdom that social
regulation-actions affecting health, safety, and the environment-
must yield to economic regulation and economic growth. Also, in some
cases consumer perceptions of risk may not lead, through lobbying,
constituency pressure, or direct petition, to direct agency regulation.
Rather, agencies such as the Consumer Product Safety Commission
may act in advance of individual or social perceptions of risk and
thereby shape those perceptions. 52
Even if we accept the notion that American society is now risk-
averse, we still need a sophisticated understanding of the strengths and
weaknesses of alternative regulatory approaches, whether public or pri-
vate, to various hazards. Shapo provides a list of general principles,
useful in summarizing a consensus regarding the general goals to be
sought in regulation. Such a list, however, in the words of another re-
viewer, can "only facilitate judgments at the margin, the sort reflected
in exhortations to legislators and regulators to heed the lessons of expe-
rience and improve their procedures." 53
Shapo offers little assistance in designing regulatory responses to
new chemical hazards or to emerging areas of scientific research. He
has not placed his case studies, which are intended to justify a risk-
averse regulatory posture, in the larger context of government regula-
tion. Drug regulation, the source of most of his examples, represents a
distinct category of hazards to which Congress has assigned a highly
risk-averse position. But the larger context is that of uncertainty, in-
cluding uncertainty about the allocation of burdens. Lawyers know
that allocation of the burden of proof and persuasion is often disposi-
tive of outcome. Drug regulation is a paradigm for a restrictive model
in which proponents of a technology must produce data in support of
51. Wildavsky, Richer is Safer, 60 PUB. INTERFST 23, 32 (1980).
52. See generally Okrent, Comment on Societal Risk, 208 ScI. 372 (1980).
53. Merrill, supra note 84, at 473.
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safety before a product can be marketed. Insufficiency of data leads to
agency disapproval of the drug.54 This assignment of the burden of
uncertainty represents an extreme stance in government regulation, not
a prevalent and expanding one. Toxic-substances regulation, for exam-
ple, is not based on this model, but rather on a compromise position of
premarket notification.5 5 Regulation of occupational hazards in the
workplace, in accordance with the Supreme Court's decision in Indus-
trial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute,5 6
places the burden of proof on the Occupational Health and Safety Ad-
ministration to show, on the basis of substantial evidence, that it is at
least more likely than not that long-term exposure to benzene presents
a significant risk of material health impairment.5 7 The National Envi-
ronmental Protection Act imposes on the Environmental Protection
Agency heavy burdens of production of evidence concerning environ-
mental hazards.5 8 The complexity of the burdens assigned to various
agencies regulating a spectrum of activities suggests that Shapo sweeps
too broadly and imprecisely in his statements about public policy.5 9
Advocating a risk-averse position, without a more detailed discussion
of the problem of burdens of proof, relative institutional capacities, and
distinctions among classes of hazards, is like arguing against sin-such
a position is fine but it lacks specificity as a guide to action. Shapo
mentions a few legal mechanisms in passing, such as the proposed Sci-
ence Court60 and the expanding common law of public nuisance,6' but
few other significant alternatives are found in the book.
54. Section 355(d) of the Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act provides that the Secretary can
refuse to approve any new drug if industry fails to submit adequate safety tests. 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(d) (1976).
55. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1976). For a description of the compromise, see Toxic
ToRTS: TORT ACTIONS FOR CANCER AND LUNG DIsEASE DUE TO ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION
330, 333-35 (P. Rhemgold, N. Landau & M. Canavan eds. 1977).
56. 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
57. Id. at 653.
58. The National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1976), re-
quires a cost-benefit analysis, according to the courts interpreting the statute. See Calvert Cliffs
Coordinating Comm. v. Atomic Energy Comm., 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). NEPA thus
imposes a heavy burden of study and documentation. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332(2)(A)-(C), (E)
(1976).
59. For a particularly lucid presentation of the regulatory burdens of uncertainty and a spec-
trum of the requirements for cost-benefit analysis, see Rodgers, Benefits, Costs, and Risks Over-
sight of Health and Environmental Decisionmaking, 4 HARV. ENVT'L L. REV. 191 (1980). For a
detailed study of a particular technology, nuclear power, see the carefully argued position in Yel-
lin, High Technology and the Courts: Nuclear Power and the Need for Institutional Reform, 94
HARv. L. REV. 489 (1981).
60. M. SHApo, supra note 3, at 257.
61. Id. 259.
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III. CONCLUSION
-A Nation of Guinea Pigs contains useful descriptions of the genesis
and history of several significant regulatory problems. Unfortunately,
Marshall Shapo fails to develop sufficiently several notions in the book,
allowing himself to be sidetracked by a world of hazards for which the
drug is the exemplar and the Food and Drug Administration is the
paradigm regulator. His discussion of the scientific enterprise, in one
of the most interesting chapters in the book, uses material from various
nonlegal sources to outline for the nonscientist some of the forces that
affect scientific work and the dynamics of the discovery process. He
recognizes correctly that a lawyer must understand the characteristics
of modem science because lawyers confront the results of science in
attempting to understand the risks and implications of research and in
evaluating the opinions of technical experts in areas ranging from envi-
ronmental law to malpractice litigation. Knowing how scientists think
and work is essential for lawyers. Such knowledge enables them to
evaluate scientific hazards accurately, even through the filter of scien-
tific tests and opinion. From a lawyer's viewpoint, the increasing inter-
action between law and science suggests that the study of science
should be an essential task for lawyers and regulators in the future.62
An elaboration of chapters one and eight would have provided a useful
monograph on the regulation of science, leaving the remainder of the
book (except chapter seven) to discuss lessons to be learned from food
and drug regulation. Given Shapo's failure to weave together the sepa-
rate threads he raises into a coherent theory of legal control of scientific
endeavor, one must conclude that A Nation of Guinea Pigs does not
achieve its stated goal.
62. See Graff, Book Review, 93 HARV. L. REv. 282, 287-88 (1979). See also Markey, Science
and Lawu-To ward a Happier Marriage, 59 J. PAT. OFF. Soc. 343 (1977).
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